Amoeba
Lattices · RLWE · niccs.org.cn(opens in a new tab)
- Programmes
- NGCC R1
- Status
- NGCC round 1
- Security flags
- Implementation findings (all sets)
Third-party findings: full report on ngcc.dev(opens in a new tab).
Parameter sets
| Parameter set | Level | pk (B) | ct (B) | pk+ct (B) | Keygen | Encaps | Decaps |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Amoeba-576 Implementation findings | 128-bit | 784 | 1,047 | 1,831 | 100.8 µs | 138.2 µs | 150.5 µs |
| Amoeba-1152 Implementation findings | 256-bit | 1,648 | 1,833 | 3,481 | 159.4 µs | 210.2 µs | 235.1 µs |
| Amoeba-1728 Implementation findings | 384-bit | 2,440 | 2,769 | 5,209 | 236.5 µs | 315.3 µs | 355.0 µs |
| Amoeba-2304 Implementation findings | 512-bit | 3,520 | 3,914 | 7,434 | 304.0 µs | 412.7 µs | 467.7 µs |
Wall-clock times vary between runs and machines (CPU frequency scaling, other tenants on cloud VMs); cycle counts are the steadier basis for comparison.
Security flags
- Implementation findings (all parameter sets): The submitted decapsulation checks only part of the ciphertext (Li) and exposes decoder failures (Xiong and Wang), both allowing key recovery. A one-bit ciphertext change overflows a buffer (Saarinen), and SM3 expansion caps the 384- and 512-bit sets at 2^256 (Saarinen). Full findings report(opens in a new tab)
History
- Update
NGCC round 1: we checked every confirmed critical and high-severity finding on ngcc.dev against our data, and the PKC Forum, the ngcc-harness issues, the public analysis repositories and ePrint for findings ngcc.dev does not list. New broken flags: OPS-DSA, whose specified challenge sampler allows forgery from the public key in 2^39 to 2^90 trials (Xiong and Wang); the compact SQIsign2D2 sets, where one signature yields forgeries on fresh messages (Feussner); BAG-Piglet, whose specified rejection key gives key recovery from decapsulation queries (Saarinen); MAMBA-Viper-384 and -512, whose specification derives every session secret from a 256-bit seed (Saarinen); FlexTree-160, where verifiers that follow the specification accept forgeries after about 2^40 work (Kudinov); TRINE-128, whose specified unsalted round seeds allow forgery in about 2^95 work (Feussner); and UVW-256 signatures, which leak an equivalent signing key as at UVW-128 (Feussner, extended by Saarinen). New warnings: HEP-QC, whose public key is distinguishable from random (Xie), and Rhyme-SHAKE-128, where a signer that follows the specified rejection bound leaks its secret (Feussner). New implementation notes cover rejection keys over the re-encryption (CheetahKEM, LoongKEM), partial FO checks (QUBE), buffer overflows (Amoeba, MORNING-ATLAS), 32-bit message lengths (Aigis-Sig+, CS), message compression and short prehashes (COMPASS-SIG, VDOO, Amoeba), wrapper boundaries and signed-message opening (VDOO, MORNING-ATLAS), malleable encodings (SQIsignTriangle) and fail-open key generation (ZEN). Each flag credits and links its finding.