VDOO
VDOO: Vinegar-Diagonal-Oil-Oil
Multivariate · UOV-type MQ · niccs.org.cn(opens in a new tab)
- Programmes
- NGCC R1
- Latest version
- Round 1 ·
- Security flags
- Implementation findings (all sets)
Third-party findings: full report on ngcc.dev(opens in a new tab).
Parameter sets
Round 1 · 20 Sep 2026
| Parameter set | Level | pk (B) | sig (B) | pk+sig (B) | Sign | Verify |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| VDOO-128 Implementation findings | 128-bit | 330,855 | 85 | 330,940 | 51.19 ms | 628.7 µs |
| VDOO-256 Implementation findings | 256-bit | 4,289,250 | 316 | 4,289,566 | 60.92 ms | 840.2 µs |
| VDOO-512 Implementation findings | 512-bit | 20,229,300 | 471 | 20,229,771 | 327.67 ms | 1.78 ms |
Wall-clock times vary between runs and machines (CPU frequency scaling, other tenants on cloud VMs); cycle counts are the steadier basis for comparison.
Security flags
- Implementation findings (all parameter sets): Keys and signing randomness are reproducible (Saarinen), restricted coefficients allow public-key-only forgery at VDOO-128 (Feussner), signatures verify on shifted messages (Saarinen) and a 256-bit prehash caps VDOO-256 and -512 at 2^128 (Saarinen). Full findings report(opens in a new tab)
Only one version of VDOO is recorded, so there is nothing to compare yet.
History
- Update
NGCC round 1: we checked every confirmed critical and high-severity finding on ngcc.dev against our data, and the PKC Forum, the ngcc-harness issues, the public analysis repositories and ePrint for findings ngcc.dev does not list. New broken flags: OPS-DSA, whose specified challenge sampler allows forgery from the public key in 2^39 to 2^90 trials (Xiong and Wang); the compact SQIsign2D2 sets, where one signature yields forgeries on fresh messages (Feussner); BAG-Piglet, whose specified rejection key gives key recovery from decapsulation queries (Saarinen); MAMBA-Viper-384 and -512, whose specification derives every session secret from a 256-bit seed (Saarinen); FlexTree-160, where verifiers that follow the specification accept forgeries after about 2^40 work (Kudinov); TRINE-128, whose specified unsalted round seeds allow forgery in about 2^95 work (Feussner); and UVW-256 signatures, which leak an equivalent signing key as at UVW-128 (Feussner, extended by Saarinen). New warnings: HEP-QC, whose public key is distinguishable from random (Xie), and Rhyme-SHAKE-128, where a signer that follows the specified rejection bound leaks its secret (Feussner). New implementation notes cover rejection keys over the re-encryption (CheetahKEM, LoongKEM), partial FO checks (QUBE), buffer overflows (Amoeba, MORNING-ATLAS), 32-bit message lengths (Aigis-Sig+, CS), message compression and short prehashes (COMPASS-SIG, VDOO, Amoeba), wrapper boundaries and signed-message opening (VDOO, MORNING-ATLAS), malleable encodings (SQIsignTriangle) and fail-open key generation (ZEN). Each flag credits and links its finding.
- New version
Round 1