ZEN
Lattices · NTRU/RLWE · niccs.org.cn(opens in a new tab)
- Programmes
- NGCC R1
- Status
- NGCC round 1
- Security flags
- Implementation findings (3 of 5 sets)
Third-party findings: full report on ngcc.dev(opens in a new tab).
Parameter sets
| Parameter set | Level | pk (B) | ct (B) | pk+ct (B) | Keygen | Encaps | Decaps |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZEN_128 Recommended Implementation findings | 128-bit | 615 | 512 | 1,127 | 45.8 µs | 34.5 µs | 39.2 µs |
| ZEN_256 Recommended Implementation findings | 256-bit | 1,229 | 1,024 | 2,253 | 68.3 µs | 40.4 µs | 52.7 µs |
| ZEN_512 Recommended Implementation findings | 512-bit | 2,458 | 2,048 | 4,506 | 191.6 µs | 108.4 µs | 139.0 µs |
| ZEN-256-backup | 256-bit | 1,229 | 1,229 | 2,458 | no code(No implementation in the submission package) | no code(No implementation in the submission package) | no code(No implementation in the submission package) |
| ZEN-512-backup | 512-bit | 2,458 | 2,458 | 4,916 | no code(No implementation in the submission package) | no code(No implementation in the submission package) | no code(No implementation in the submission package) |
Wall-clock times vary between runs and machines (CPU frequency scaling, other tenants on cloud VMs); cycle counts are the steadier basis for comparison.
Security flags
- Implementation findings (ZEN_128, ZEN_256, ZEN_512): Key generation ignores XOF failures, so under address-space exhaustion it can return a decryption key sampled from stale stack data (Wen and Wu). Full findings report(opens in a new tab)
History
- Update
NGCC round 1: we checked every confirmed critical and high-severity finding on ngcc.dev against our data, and the PKC Forum, the ngcc-harness issues, the public analysis repositories and ePrint for findings ngcc.dev does not list. New broken flags: OPS-DSA, whose specified challenge sampler allows forgery from the public key in 2^39 to 2^90 trials (Xiong and Wang); the compact SQIsign2D2 sets, where one signature yields forgeries on fresh messages (Feussner); BAG-Piglet, whose specified rejection key gives key recovery from decapsulation queries (Saarinen); MAMBA-Viper-384 and -512, whose specification derives every session secret from a 256-bit seed (Saarinen); FlexTree-160, where verifiers that follow the specification accept forgeries after about 2^40 work (Kudinov); TRINE-128, whose specified unsalted round seeds allow forgery in about 2^95 work (Feussner); and UVW-256 signatures, which leak an equivalent signing key as at UVW-128 (Feussner, extended by Saarinen). New warnings: HEP-QC, whose public key is distinguishable from random (Xie), and Rhyme-SHAKE-128, where a signer that follows the specified rejection bound leaks its secret (Feussner). New implementation notes cover rejection keys over the re-encryption (CheetahKEM, LoongKEM), partial FO checks (QUBE), buffer overflows (Amoeba, MORNING-ATLAS), 32-bit message lengths (Aigis-Sig+, CS), message compression and short prehashes (COMPASS-SIG, VDOO, Amoeba), wrapper boundaries and signed-message opening (VDOO, MORNING-ATLAS), malleable encodings (SQIsignTriangle) and fail-open key generation (ZEN). Each flag credits and links its finding.